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RATES p.a. of 10 issues (not August and September)

SURFACE £4 UK & Europe, \$(US)10 elsewhere

AIR £5.50 Europe, \$(US)20 N.America, \$(US)25 Australasia



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Readers who have been following the struggle for the leadership of the Greek Department at Liverpool with keener interest than that for that of the British Labour Party will be glad to know that LCM is safe - at least for the moment, for the Editor as a good student of Greek is unwilling to look beyond τὸ πᾶν ποδός - δεδός ἂν εἴη - and they will wish to join him in congratulating Dr H.J.Blumenthal on his appointment to the Headship of the Department, which should secure its survival for the next twenty years, as well as the preservation of its reputation as one of the leading centres for the study of later Greek philosophy in this country and indeed elsewhere, a reputation founded by Professor A.H.Armstrong in 1950 and enhanced by Professor A.A.Long, and also in hoping that the Head may before too long be crowned with a Chair, whether personal, titular, promotional (but it is surely the duty of all Professors to promote as well as to profess their subjects) or best of all the Gladstone Chair. In which connexion, however, he notes with concern what seems to be a growing tendency at many Universities in this country to favour in Arts Faculties groupings of Departments into larger units only able, it is held, to sustain a single Chair though they contain a number of subject-disciplines and Departments. The practice in Science Departments is generally different, and a decrease in the number of Arts Professors in the governing bodies of Universities proportionately to Science ones, while it may be in accordance with Government policy - or a symptom of the cultural philistinism deemed characteristic of what in this context he had better call the English, can only increase the way in which the liberal arts are disadvantaged in comparison with the Sciences, which more immediately and obviously contribute to the economic prosperity of the country, and in which methods of research and teaching are very different.

But LCM is not a political broadsheet, even if the Editor, who has not been slow to publish letters of commendation (most recently, LCM 8.7[Jul.1983], 97), feels bound to report also that he hears it is in some places referred to as the *Private Eye* of classical journals. Yet the Editor knows no scandals among classical scholars, and if he did he would not publish them. He suspects the description may reflect the widely held belief that he publishes all the contributions he receives, but refuses to be provoked into revealing the *arcana imperii*. He similarly hears reports from time to time of dissatisfaction with the length of the period between the acceptance (not the receipt) of an article and its appearance, though when addressed to him directly such complaints usually take the tactful form of an enquiry whether the article has not perhaps gone astray in the post. But the backlog is now down to some nine months - human rather than elephantine gestation - and the Editor sometimes cynically suspects that complainants do not much care how long other people have to wait .... What will get published very rapidly is short notes such as those on pp.140, 142, 143 and 144, though it would help if authors could indicate the number of words.

The increased departmental work-load and other factors have meant that LCM appears rather later in the month than the Editor could sometimes wish, and invoicing has fallen behindhand, nor has the tally of subscribers been published for some months, but in fact it has risen by 12 since the last figure of 376 (LCM 8.4[Apr.1983], 49) making, if his arithmetic is quite correct, 388 which raises hopes of 400 in the New Year and suggests that satisfied readers and subscribers continue to outnumber the others. And before space is exhausted, let him say that he is aware that 8.7, July, had margins too small for binding and it has been reprinted and will be replaced.

I In LCM 7.10(Dec.1982), 149-150, A.A.R.Sheppard offered some interesting speculations about the career of Dio Chrysostom: *Orationes* 33, 66, 79 and 80 were all delivered in Tarsus during Dio's exile, and show him, to some extent, in the role of political 'dissident'<sup>1</sup>.

The veracity of Dio's claim (3.13, 45.1, 50.8; cf. Lucian, *Peregr.* 18) to have exercised unfettered *παρρησία* under Domitian has been doubted. Some have supposed either that the claim is greatly exaggerated or that the relevant works have perished<sup>2</sup>. Sheppard's reconstruction seems to provide an attractive answer to the problem: Dio did practice *παρρησία*, but of a veiled kind. One may well sympathize in general with this view of Dio<sup>3</sup> (especially if one dates the Diogenes discourses to the exile period<sup>4</sup>). Nevertheless, while any detailed reconstruction of this period of Dio's career must be speculative, Sheppard's seems suspect in several respects.

His case goes as follows (for convenience I have rearranged the various steps, without, I hope, misrepresenting the argument);

1. At 40.1 (in a speech datable to 101) Dio refers to the ambitions of the Tarsians and Antiochenes in such a way as (possibly) to suggest a prior visit to the Levant, which would have to be dated to the exile period (c. 83-96/7).

2. *Orr.* 79 and 80 were delivered in Tarsus and should be dated to the exile period.

3. *Or.* 33, explicitly delivered in Tarsus, is also exilic.

4. *Or.* 66 is exilic, and may have been delivered in Tarsus in 89.

I consider these arguments in turn. If the following analysis seems rather finicky, I hope that it will at least bring out one fundamental point: the ical approach to so multi-faceted a writer as Dio.

1. This inference is nowhere near 'convincing' (Dio might easily have known of these rivalries without visiting Tarsus); on the other hand, it is of course possible. In any event, this is only a small part of Sheppard's case.

2. The inference that *Orr.* 79 and 80 were delivered in Tarsus depends solely on the manuscript titles *περὶ πλούτου τῶν ἐν Κιλικίᾳ* (Parisinus 2985) and *τῶν ἐν Κιλικίᾳ περὶ ἐλευθερίας* (all manuscripts except Parisinus 2985) respectively.

In both speeches the internal indications of place of delivery require discussion.

a). *Or.* 79. The speech begins: *Φέρε πρὸς θεῶν, ἐπὶ τίνι μάλιστα θαυμάζειν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ μέγα φρονεῖν καὶ μακαρίζεν ἄξιον πόλιν ἀπασῶν μεγίστην καὶ δυνατωτάτην*; Two questions arise: i) what πόλις is referred to here? ii) is this the πόλις in which the speech was made?

H.L.Crosby, Loeb edition Vol.5, 303, assuming that the πόλις here referred to must be the place of delivery, argues that it cannot be Rome, on the ground that 'were that the case, one may question whether he would have identified himself with his hearers as he does on 5' (79.5 *ἄρα ἐνθυμέσθε ὅτι πάντες οὗτοι ... φόρους παρ' ἡμῶν λαμβάνουσιν, οὐ τῆς χώρας οὐδὲ τῶν βοσκομάτων, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἀνοίας τῆς ἡμετέρας*). He suggests that, given the manuscript title of Parisinus 2985, the πόλις should be Tarsus, and he cites as a parallel the description of Tarsus in 34.7: *μεγίστην ... τὴν πόλιν τῶν ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ καὶ μητροπόλιν ἔξ ἀρχῆς*.

But there the qualification *τῶν ἐν τῇ Κιλικίᾳ* makes a vital difference, as is shown by comparison with the descriptions of Rhodes in 31.62 *τὸ χωρὶς μίς (sc. Rome) πᾶσιν τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν*, Alexandria in 32.35 *ἡ ... πόλις ὑμῶν τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ τόπῳ πλεῖστον ὅσον διαφέρει καὶ περιφανῶς ἀποδεδείκται δευτέρα τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν ἥλιον (i.e. second to Rome), and Rome itself in 11.138 πόλιν ... τὴν μεγίστην πασῶν*. That the bare superlatives of 79.1 denote Rome is confirmed by the sequel. Dio describes the city as adorned with paintings and statues whose former owners are now 'slaves, of low estate, and poor', and then pointedly observes that the Corinthians' art and commerce failed to preserve their political independence, clearly alluding to the sack of Corinth in 146 B.C.. Crosby's other arguments, from 79.5, is equally unconvincing (*pace* Sheppard 149). Philosophers in 'diatribes' (like clergymen in sermons) often include themselves in the category 'we foolish people' in order to bridge the gap between them and their audience. From that point of view, Dio could have counted himself among the *ἡμεῖς* of practically any prosperous πόλις (especially after the very general *ἡμῶν* and *ἡμῶν* references in 79.4).

Sheppard and Desideri<sup>5</sup> believe that, while 79.1 alludes to Rome, the speech was delivered elsewhere. There are difficulties with such a reading of the speech. Fir it seems only natural to assume (à la Crosby and Jones 128) that the first and only πόλις explicitly mentioned is the place of delivery. Moreover, just as Rome is enriched by the wealth of Babylonians, by amber produced by the Celts

1. Dr Sheppard and I have discussed some of these points in conversation without reaching agreement.
2. So C.P.Jones, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, Cambridge, Mass., and London 1978 (hereafter 'Jones'), 50.
3. Well expounded by D.R.Dudley, *A History of Cynicism*, London 1937, 152f.
4. This traditional dating is challenged by A.D.Momigliano, *Quarto Contributo*, Rome 1969, 261f., and Jones 49f. with (in my view) unconvincing arguments. I have not seen A.Brancacci, *Tradizione cinica e problemi di datazione nelle orazioni diogeniane di Dione di Prusa*, *Elenchos* 1(1980), 92-122, and do not know what his position is.
5. P.Desideri, *Dione di Prusa: un intellettuale greco nell'impero romano*, Firenze 1978 (hereafter 'Desideri'), 232ff.. Since in what follows I disagree with Desideri on nearly every point, and since his book has not, on the whole, had the reception it deserves, I take this opportunity of registering my view that it is a formidable and impressive work which makes most recent research on Dio look superficial.

(79.4), and by ivory produced by the Indians (79.4), so the *ἡμεῖς* of 79.5 import wealth from the Celts, Indians and Babylonians, and just as Rome teems with silver and gold imported from the ends of the earth, so silver and gold in *ἡ ἡμετέρα γῆ* (79.5) are used to acquire amber and gold from far-off lands (79.6). Dio's organization of his material in this speech is a little loose<sup>6</sup> (*suo more*), but *prima facie* Rome, the πόλις of 79.1, and the *ἡμεῖς* of 79.5 are equated. Again, the development of thought from 79.1 seems to fall into a pattern repeatedly used by Dio in his major public addresses in large cities when he wishes to disconcert his audience: the emphatic rejection of the conventional sophistic ἐγκώμιον of the physical attributes of the city in question, followed by the insistence that these things are worthless and that what matters is the moral wellbeing of the citizens (cf. e.g. 32.35ff., 33.2ff., 17ff., 34.7ff., 39.2ff., 48.9). In sum, the natural reading of the speech is that it was delivered in Rome. Nevertheless, the speech would make some sort of sense (though it would be less well written) if we suppose that it was delivered in a Greek city, and that Dio's purpose was to hold up the decadence of Rome as a particularly striking example of the decadence to which all so-called civilized states are subject. Thus the natural reading would have to be set aside if other considerations seemed to make that necessary. I shall consider the possible 'other considerations' below.

b) *Or.* 80. Dio alludes casually to Numa in a list of law-givers in 80.3 (the others are Solon, Dracon, and Zaleucus). This need not imply delivery in Rome - educated Greeks would have heard of Numa, and in fact the characterization of Homer at 80.7 as τοῦ καθ' ἑμῆς σκωπτάτου indicates a Greek audience. But Sheppard's suggestion (149) that 'the comments on vain strife in 80.4 may recall those of 34.45' (from the Second Tarsic Oration) is unhappy: not only are the contexts rather different but also, on Sheppard's own view, *Or.* 80 is exilic and *Or.* 34 Trajanic.

So much for the internal indications of place of delivery in *Or.* 79 and 80. One must also consider arguments from dating: the two questions are naturally interrelated (if *Or.* 79 were provably exilic, it could not have been made in Rome).

Sheppard 150 seems to accept the arguments of Desideri 209f. and 232ff. for dating both speeches to the exile period. But these arguments, though not unreasonable, fall very short of proof. In general Desideri regards the thought of the speeches - in 79 the strong attack on material riches and the specific criticism of Rome, in 80 the emphasis on the true freedom possessed by the philosopher - as characteristic of Dio's exile. Characteristic it may very well be, but that is hardly enough to exclude the possibility that Dio could well have expressed such views, commonplace as they are, either earlier or later. One could argue that the rather Cynic tone of both speeches favours an exile, or possibly a post-exile, dating, but this leads one into other areas of controversy<sup>7</sup>. The most solid indication of dating seems to be provided by Dio's description of the philosopher in 80.1, which has obvious self-reference. The philosopher is seen not so much as a 'wanderer' (the discussion of Jones 135 is a little inaccurate) but as completely disengaged from public life. This suggests an exilic or post-exile context, the former being more plausible since the description would be less appropriate when Dio had returned to political prominence both in Rome and in Prusa. Certainty is unattainable, but I think it likely that *Or.* 80 is exilic and that it may have been delivered in Tarsus, as the *MSS* titles would seem to imply.

But this need not mean that *Or.* 79 belongs to the same period. Sheppard seems just to assume that the two speeches are a pair. In reality (if we exclude insubstantial arguments based on 'similarity of thought'), the only reasons for linking the speeches are: a) their proximity in the extant corpus of Dio's works and b) the *MSS* titles. But a) cannot be pressed: some of the works in the corpus are grouped in chronological groups, but some are not. As for b), while all *MSS* except Parisinus 2985 title *Or.* 80 τῶν ἐν Κιλικίᾳ περὶ ἐλευθερίας, only Parisinus 2985 titles *Or.* 79 περὶ πλούτου ἐν Κιλικίᾳ. In this confused state of affairs, it seems arbitrary to rely on the supposed authority of 'early scholia': one must rather weigh that supposed authority against the natural reading of *Or.* 79, which is (as I have argued) that it was delivered in Rome. At best, the conclusion must be *non liquet*, though in my opinion it is more probable that the speech was delivered in Rome, and if so, after, rather than before, the exile.

3. Sheppard 150 shows that if *Or.* 33, the First Tarsic Oration, is pre-Trajanic, it must at least be post-72. He disputes Desideri's Vespasianic dating because of Dio's clear philosophical claims, which would, he thinks, be out of place in 'a speech to a public meeting in a provincial capital after Vespasian's quarrel with the philosophers and Dio's own ignominious recantation in the speech *Against the Philosophers*'. It is hard to know what formal weight to attach to such an argument. After all, on Sheppard's own reconstruction, Dio said provocative things in a provincial capital during his exile under Domitian. Could he not similarly have claimed to be a philosopher and praised philosophy in speeches to provincial audiences in the 70s, despite the unhappy events of 71? It is, indeed, possible, perhaps even probable, that the Rhodian Oration, in which Dio pays a warm, though veiled, tribute to Musonius Rufus (31.122), and the Alexandrian Oration (*Or.* 32), in which Dio certainly makes philosophical claims, should both be dated to the early 70s after 71<sup>8</sup>.

6. Cf. Crosby 309 n.2.

7. It is disputed whether, or how far, or in what sense, Dio 'went Cynic' during his exile. For my view see *JHS* 98(1978) (hereafter 'Moles'), 94; other views: Jones 49f.; Desideri 200f., 537ff.; and presumably Brancacci (n.4 above).

8. Date of the Rhodian: Momigliano, *JRS* 41(1951), 150f. = *Quinto Contributo*, Rome 1975, II, 971ff.; Jones 133; Musonius at 31.122: Moles 82f.; Rhodian post-71?: see my attempted reconstruction in Moles 86f.; Vespasianic dating of the Alexandrian (?): Jones, *Historia* 22(1973), 302-9, and *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom* 134; though there are difficulties with this dating (see Moles 84 n.48; Sheppard also raises doubts in an as yet unpublished paper), it still seems to me plausible (the arguments against it of J.F. Kindstrand, *Historia* 27[1978], 378-83, depend on an uncritical reading of *Or.* 13).

But the real question is whether *Or.33* is pre-Trajanic at all<sup>9</sup>. Desideri again relies heavily on the criteria of 'similarity of thought' as an argument for contemporaneity and, conversely, dissimilarity of thought as an argument for chronological separation. Thus on his view *Or.33* belongs in the 70s because it has '*numerosi punti di contatto*' with the Alexandrian and Rhodian Orations (Desideri 122ff.) and because there are great differences, of various kinds (Desideri 423), between it and *Or.34*, the Second Tarsic Oration, which is probably Trajanic<sup>10</sup>. Again, one suspects that Desideri takes Dio's Thought a little too seriously - not because Dio's thoughts are trivial (they are admittedly mostly simple, but often worthwhile, particularly in context) but because on the whole they are of such an unremarkable character that it is difficult to trace (and perhaps implausible to suppose) real change or development in them<sup>11</sup>.

Here one wonders also whether Desideri and Sheppard (who follows Desideri in this respect) do not overstate the differences in tone and content between *Or.33* and *34*. As for tone, *Or.33*, a moral address which concentrates on the manners, tastes and deportment of the Tarsians, is written in the *σπουδαίου λόγου* tradition; *Or.34*, which is a formal political speech, is not. These differences prove nothing whatsoever about dating. As for content, Desideri's claim that the speeches differ radically depends largely on the correctness of 'identifying the orientalizing troublemakers of *33.38 & 48* with the linen workers of *34.21*; Dio ridicules the former, but urges that the latter should be given citizenship. If the two speeches were made during the same visit, the change of viewpoint on a matter of serious and immediate political importance would be surprising' (Sheppard 150). This argument seems to me very unconvincing. In the first place, the 'identification' is forced. In *33.37ff.* Dio does not seem to be singling out any particular group for condemnation: his argument rather is that practically the whole population of Tarsus behaves in an unseemly and un-Hellenic way (*33.41*), and for most of the speech he uses second person plurals in talking about the objects of his disapproval. In the second place, even if the 'identification' is conceded, there seems no great inconsistency in (a) making a speech criticizing the decadent, un-Hellenic, Oriental habits of some of the populace and (b) urging in another speech that - in the interests of civic harmony - these people should be brought within the political system. The first is a plea for the maintenance of Greek cultural integrity, the second a practical recognition of the fact that immigrant groups, especially those of long standing, are best assimilated into the political life of the city. So today a British politician of conservative, but not entirely blinkered, views might, if he were being frank (and Dio is being frank in *Or.33*), argue that the integrity of the British way of life was threatened by immigrant cultural influences but at the same time maintain that it would be foolish to exclude such immigrants from the British political system<sup>12</sup>.

Sheppard also suggests that the allusion in *Or.34* (*34.10-11*) to the quarrel between Tarsus and Aegaeae as 'belonging to the former time' supports an earlier dating for *Or.33* (since *33.51* attests contemporary hostility between Tarsus and Aegaeae). But nothing can be made of this; there seems to have been continuous hostility between Tarsus and Aegaeae (*33.51* // *34.47*; Jones 137 even takes *33.51* // *34.14, 47*, as indicating a single visit to Tarsus). More substantially, Crosby, Loeb 5, 335, points out that in *Or.33* Dio appears as an invited guest (*33.1ff.*), whereas in *34* he comes as a messenger from God in a time of need (*34.4* - i.e., presumably, as a messenger from Trajan: cf Desideri 118). But even this need not entail two separate visits: Dio could have delivered *Or.34* as an imperial agent and then been asked to deliver *33*. On the other side, Jones 136 correctly observes that in *33.14* Dio implies that he is not young. Dio's claims to philosophical status (*33.8 & 13-16*) are also interesting. The way in which the description of the philosopher is couched rather strongly suggests an exile or post-exile dating, when Dio's *persona* as a philosopher who had been through hard times was firmly established: *33.14* 'do not expect from such a man any flattery or deception, or that clever and seductive language which is most in use in dealing with democracies and satraps and tyrants' (is court life under Domitian alluded to here?); *33.15* '... a man, having seen how much there is that is dreadful and hateful in the world, and that everywhere are countless enemies, both public and private, with whom luxury and deceit hold sway, "subdues his body with injurious blows, | Casts round his shoulders sorry rags, in guise | A slave, steals into the wide-wayed town of those | Who hold debauch" [*Odyssey* 4.244-6, 'reinterpreted' by Dio], meaning no harm to his neighbours ... but on the contrary seeking if perchance he may unobtrusively do them some good ...' (this is clearly autobiographical)<sup>13</sup>.

To sum up. To put it at its lowest, the case that *Or.33* is much earlier than *34* has not been made out. It seems to me much more likely that the speech is late and that it belongs to the same general period as *Or.34*, both speeches being Trajanic. The two speeches may even have been made in

9. I here retract my own suggestion in Moles 88 n.73.

10. Cf. Jones 136f.: Desideri 423ff..

11. Cf. in general Moles 93ff.

12. A 'liberal' might welcome the cultural diversity introduced by different racial groups, a 'fascist' might argue for their repatriation or disfranchisement; Dio fall somewhere in between - he is a conservative cultural nationalist capable of relatively enlightened attitudes to outsiders.

13. Cf. in general Moles 94f.. The picture of the philosopher in *33.14-15* fuses Dio's Odysseus *persona* (Moles 97) with the Cynic conception of the philosopher, which was of course itself heavily influenced by the figure of Odysseus. Cf. especially Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* (frr.15 & 16 Caizzi) with the excellent discussion of R.Hölstad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King*, Uppsala 1948, 94ff..

the same visit.

4. The critical passage in *Or. 66* is a sentence in 66.6:

ἔτι δὲ ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἑτέραν οἰκίαν συντριβεῖσαν πλουσιωτέραν ἐκείνης διὰ γλῶτταν καὶ  
 ἢ Δία ἑτέραν κινδυνεύουσαν.  
 γλῶτταν MSS δόξαν Herwerden ἐκείνης - i.e. the house of Pelops.

The traditional interpretation, following von Arnim, is that the house ruined because of a tongue is Nero's and the house in jeopardy is Domitian's.

Sheppard 149 suggests to the contrary that a) better candidates for the first οἰκία are the families of L. Aelius Plautius Lamia Aelianus, the historian Hermogenes of Tarsus, and the rhetor Maternus, of whom Plautius had a reputation for great wealth and Hermogenes may have been very wealthy (the possible allusion to Hermogenes seems in fact to be Sheppard's only argument for placing *Or. 66* in Tarsus): b) if the second house is Domitian's (Sheppard is agnostic over this), 89 - the time of the open rebellion of Saturninus - would be a better context than 95/6 (von Arnim's dating). (One notes that, if so, the family of Maternus, executed in 91, is excluded as a candidate for the first οἰκία reference).

Sheppard's arguments against von Arnim's interpretation are as follows:

1) von Arnim associated Dio's remarks with the reports of prophecies of Domitian's death being circulated in 95/6, but these prophecies must in many cases have been either *post eventum* or clandestine;

2) γλῶττα 'is not used of singing, but of speech, especially of a tactless or licentious kind, like the English "lip"'. This objection seems to have been anticipated by Jones 50, who sees indeed an allusion to Nero, but of a different kind from von Arnim's: 'The house ... could well be the line of the Julii and Claudii, for Dio elsewhere ascribes Nero's ruin to his garrulity (*Or. 21.9*)'. It is presumably to counter Jones' suggestion that Sheppard remarks: 'It is true that Dio himself at one time apparently believed that Nero owed his downfall to tales told by Sporus, but he implies that this story was not generally current (*Dio 21.9*)'. In fact, both these statements are inaccurate. In 21.9 Dio does not imply that the story was not generally current - he merely says: 'the truth about this has not come out even yet'. On the other hand, he does not attribute Nero's downfall to his garrulity: he attributes it to his ὄβρις, i.e. his revolting treatment of Sporus. But these are details. How to assess Sheppard's main arguments?

We may agree that von Arnim was perhaps a little naive in taking stories about prophecies in 95/6 at face value (nobody, I hope, will believe Philostratus, *VA 8.26*, Apollonius' blow-by-blow vision of Domitian's assassination). Nevertheless, prophecies and omens may be genuine in the sense that events occur in which superstitious people may see prophetic significance at the time, or which may be exploited (also at the time) for propaganda purposes. And, quite apart from alleged prophecies and omens, it seems perfectly rational to believe that the very last years of Domitian's reign had a sort of 'end of dynasty' air about them, and still more so that those who hated Domitian, like Dio, might reasonably have hoped for his imminent downfall.

Sheppard's argument that Dio could not have used γλῶττα with reference to Nero's singing (or acting) seems to me misconceived. It is irrelevant that, when applied to an utterance, γλῶττα usually refers to speech. The word means 'tongue', and the tongue is the organ which produces vocal sound of any kind. Of course, to say that Nero's house perished because of his tongue is very striking, but the literary context requires precisely that Dio should express himself in an arresting manner. For he is developing a prolonged *reductio ad absurdum* (in Cynic style) of the careers of those who come to grief through ambition. Men beggar themselves to win crowns at athletic games - crowns such as cattle wear (66.2); their names are proclaimed in public - like those of runaway slaves (66.2). Men 'buy' at vast expense in political life the marks of distinction which can be bought for a few drachmas in the market-place (66.4). The prizes at the games are useless; the diadems of kings are rags (66.5). The house of Pelops was destroyed because of a golden lamb! It would be perfectly fitting, after all this, if Dio attributed the collapse of the Julio-Claudian dynasty to Nero's tongue. This would simply be a normal view of the relationship between Nero 'artifex' and his fall (cf. Dio 3.134; Plutarch, *Mor. 56F.* = *quomodo adulator ab amico intermoscatur* 12; Tacitus, *A. 15.67*; Cassius Dio 62(63).9), expressed in suitably striking form. An allusion to Nero would also come naturally after the preceding λέγεται ... ἐν μέσοις τοῖς θεάτροις (of stories about the house of Pelops), the more so as Dio may have found piquancy in the thought that Nero, a king, used to impersonate kings on stage (Dio 3.134; cf. Cassius Dio 62(63).9). The use of γλῶττα may be further appropriate for two reasons:

1) Dio seems deliberately to be enumerating all possible media of communication (τούτοις δὲ οὐκ ἄξιον ἀπιστεῖν, ἃ γέγραπται μὲν οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων ἀνδρῶν, Εὐριπίδου καὶ Σαφοκλέους, λέγεται δὲ ἐν μέσοις τοῖς θεάτροις· ἔτι δὲ ἰδεῖν ἔστιν ἑτέραν οἰκίαν συντριβεῖσαν πλουσιωτέραν ἐκείνης διὰ γλῶτταν ...), as if to emphasize the overwhelming evidence for the folly of ambition;

2) διὰ γλῶτταν may follow through to the second οἰκία (i.e. Dio may be implying that the other οἰκία also is in danger διὰ γλῶτταν, and not just observing *obiter* 'and by the way another great house is in danger'). If so, the expression can refer to Domitian's boastfulness, which was certainly a factor in the hatred he aroused, as well as to Nero's singing. All this seems sufficient to justify the use of γλῶττα if the allusion is to Nero's singing (and acting).

There are indeed good reasons for supposing that this is the required allusion. After the discussion of the fall of the house of Pelops a reference to a kingly house seems appropriate. The Julio-Claudian house, extinct with Nero's death, could well be described as συντριβεῖσα. The context demands an illustration not just of 'the perils of fame' (Sheppard) but of the folly of ambition (which hardly applies to any of the candidates suggested by Sheppard): Nero fits the bill excellently. Finally, the first οἰκία is πλουσιωτέρα than the house of Pelops: the richest and most illustrious house in Greek mythology. Again, the Roman imperial house seems indicated.

Thus an allusion to Nero and the Julio-Claudians seem virtually certain. If so, an allusion to Domitian and the Flavians will follow almost inevitably, especially as Domitian's γλῶττα could

- 134 reasonably (at least from the point of view of the case argued by *Or.66*) be regarded as a cause of the insecurity of his reign.

Finally, if the second οἰκία is the Flavian house, which dating is better, 89 or 95/6?<sup>14</sup> 89 is of course possible, but 95/6, as I have argued above, is equally possible, and perhaps rather more likely, because there are some quite close thematic correspondences between *Or.66* and the Fourth Kingship Oration (*Or.4*), a speech which I believe to have been delivered early in Trajan's reign<sup>15</sup>. But such an argument cannot be pressed. What does seem certain is that there is nothing at all to connect *Or.66* with Tarsus.

- 11 M. L. Bowie has suggested to me, mischievously enough, that the whole εἰ δέ ... sentence is a later insertion by Dio, as proof of both his μαρονηα and prescience. But the sentence looks integral (for reasons implicit in the above analysis), and, if such sceptical solutions are accepted, we may as well abandon the interpretative task.

15. Correspondences: for the most important see Desideri 343 n.49; date of the Fourth Kingship Oration: see my forthcoming study in *Classical Antiquity* (admittedly controversial).

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LAWRENCE J. JOST (Hellenic Center, Washington): *Antigone's engagement: a theme delayed*

LCM 8.9 (Nov. 1983), 134-136

The tragic theme of the prevented marriage to Haimon, once sounded in the sisters' encounter with Kreon, is repeatedly heard throughout the remaining three-fifths of the *Antigone*, so much so that one may overlook the possible significance of its delayed appearance<sup>1</sup>. In particular, we may well ask why it does not figure at all in the agonistic exchange between Ismene and Antigone that opens the play. When it is brought up, almost as an afterthought, in the effort to dissuade Kreon from condemning his own son's intended (568), we may well wonder why Ismene failed to use such an appeal earlier in their confrontation. It will be suggested, of course, that she omitted it because she was privy to her sister's lack of enthusiasm for an arranged, primarily political, union of Thebes' two leading houses. This suggestion, however, if taken seriously, would threaten to undermine the evident sincerity of the later *kommos*, where Antigone repeatedly mentions her unwedded state (813, 867, 876-7). She would, furthermore, be thereby rendered oblivious to any previous signs of Haimon's obvious devotion to her as well as his evidently high regard for her heroic qualities as evidenced by his remark that she is χροῖς ἀεὶ τῆς (699). It is true that in this play she does not actually witness the behaviour that caused Gerald F. Else to suggest (somewhat effusively, to be sure) 'that Haimon's love for Antigone is not of the ordinary sexual variety but a spiritual, indeed an intellectual passion: that his "madness" takes the form of a passionate belief in the rightness ... of her ideas'<sup>2</sup>. But, he would have to have been a poor suitor, indeed, not to have revealed in some measure the depth of his feelings to her, and we know from his frustrated attempt to convince his stubborn father of the folly of his course that Haimon did not lack significant rhetorical skills. In fact, the opposite is much more likely to be the case, as we shall see.

A decidedly sharp contrast between the moods and thoughts of Oedipus' daughters is carefully created for us by the impression they make in their very first utterances. To the taut, excited, compressed 'torrent of negatives'<sup>3</sup> with which Antigone ticks off their common train of woes, seeing no release in sight, Ismene's reply must seem ambivalent, at best, indicating a disappointing lack of commitment. She claims to have heard no word of the dreadful events, whether 'pleasant or painful' (12), and she does not 'know' whether her own future will prove 'fortunate or distressful' (16-17). This admission is met with a biting rejoinder - ἄδην καλῶς (18). This early contrast between conviction and diffidence is underscored later when Antigone assumes that she has presented all the facts necessary for setting up a clear test of loyalty (37-38) whereas Ismene still sees no way in which she herself can 'loosen or tighten' the 'tangled skein' of those very same facts (39-40). Indeed, she can recount the details of the family tragedy as well as her sister (49ff.)

1. A glance at the table of six dominant image sequences in the play, as provided by Goheen, clearly reveals the contrast between that of the marriage and the others. Four patterns begin in the prologue, while a fifth is heard in the first stasimon. Only late in the second episode do we hear of marriage, while the great bulk of the lines treating it fall into the second half of the play. [Robert F. Goheen, *The Imagery of Sophocles' Antigone: A Study of Poetic Language and Structure*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1951, pp.120-121].
2. Gerald F. Else, *The Madness of Antigone*, Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1976, p.55. This treatment of Haimon, more generous and detailed than most, is concentrated in section V of his monograph (pp.50-58).
3. R.P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: An Interpretation*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p.128. He goes on to note (41) that these opening lines constitute "a supreme example of characterization through style", a feature of Sophoclean technique also recently observed by P.E. Easterling in her "Character in Sophocles", *Greece & Rome* 24 (1977), p.128.
4. Sir Richard Jebb, *Sophocles: The Plays + Fragments, Part 1: The Antigone*, 3rd edn., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1900, p.16.



and yet not feel compelled to join in the proposed burial of Polyneikes, if only because she cannot see how their deaths, added to those of their brothers, will be anything but a vain and superfluous gesture (περισσὰ πρόσσειν 68).

At this point their mutual break is beyond repair, at least as far as Antigone is concerned. Instead of further remonstrance (69) or even willingness to entertain a possible change of heart (69-70), Antigone resolutely speaks in the first person singular until the end of the scene (69, 72, 73, 74, 76, 81, 89, 91, 96). We are far from having preserved that sisterly bond so strikingly signalled in the play's very first line - ὃ κοινὸν αὐτάδελφον Ἰσμήνης κάρα. In the face of her sister's intense obsession with her duty to the dead members of her family (72ff.) and the bitter reaction to her own hesitancy, it is perhaps not surprising that Ismene does not bring up the topic of the impending marriage. She is under siege, after all, and has more than enough to do in justifying her own reluctance to risk death.

One observation is made, though, that at least indirectly points to the thought that Antigone has a remarkable preference for the claims of the dead over those of the living, viz. the ironical 'You have a hot heart for the cold' (88). This suggestion is echoed later in another ironical comment on the motivation of Polyneikes' benefactor - οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτω μᾶρος ὅς θανεῖν ἐρᾷ (220). Kreon as well remarks often on Antigone's preoccupation with death. He urges her, for example, to love the dead if one should (524-5), and he goes out of his way to warn Haimon that Antigone's will likely prove a 'cold embrace' (650). The whole 'Bride of Hades' theme, of course, which chorus, Kreon and Antigone play variations on throughout the play's latter half, builds on these early indications that the heroine has an unusual attachment to the dead.

Indeed, it is this seeming preference for the underworld that Sophocles underscores throughout the play. At lines 73-76, for instance, Antigone had insisted that her obligation to please the departed was all the greater given the fact that so much more time will be spent below in Hades as opposed to that above ground. Later, she succinctly points out that she and her sister chose quite differently, one to die and the other to live (555). She even goes on to suggest that her own *psyche* has been dead a long while, enabling her to serve the interests of the dead all the more (559-560).

The important fact that by this time Ismene has come round to share her convictions (544-545), and is now ready to embrace the project, is lost on Antigone, who had, after all, predicted that such a conversion would perforce come too late. The poet, however, deftly indicates their new unity by repeating an apparently insignificant detail. Upon first seeing Antigone, Kreon had addressed her as τὴν νεύουσαν ἐς πέδον κάρα (441), as if this gesture of gazing earthward signalled her loyalty to the dead. A little later, when the chorus see Ismene approaching, they describe her as φιλάδελφα κάτω δόμου εἰσβαμένη (527). That two key words from the play's first line are repeated in these two brief descriptions hints at a common orientation downward for the two sisters, and may not be an incidental detail. More likely, it indicates that Ismene's avowal of co-conspiracy registers an emotional, if not factual, complicity in the burial of their brother. It represents a belated (by Antigone's standards) but nevertheless sincere recognition that their family's curse does require them both, after all, to renounce life.

Perhaps we are now in a position to reconsider the question with which we began. The more one reflects on what it would cost to forego one's future existence and cast her lot with the departed, the more Antigone's suppression of marital thoughts appears understandable. Her absolute singlemindedness before the deed was all but necessary for its success. If she had allowed herself to temporize, to dwell on what life still had in store for her - marriage, children, the continuance of the Labdakid line - she might never have been able to go through with it.

If we posit, then, a potentially disastrous inner conflict ward off by a desperate resolve to press on, the encounter with her sister, with all its strain and misunderstanding, becomes explicable. The suggestion here is that Antigone is victimized by a repressed realization that she is not fated to bear children, that she must - out of loyalty to, as well as identification with, her parents' miserable end - renounce her opportunity to marry Haimon. Her dead brother's claim on her is stronger than any appeal to her own happiness. Thus, if we credit Antigone with an unconscious awareness of the enormity of her sacrifice, her initial impatience with Ismene's ambivalence makes sense. They are both, after all, sisters of the dead, with an equal obligation, as she sees it, to join those below and not cling to life.

Neither brings up the theme of marriage, but for different reasons. Antigone cannot afford to confront the issue directly, for to do so would be to make it very difficult to carry out the required rites. She is in the grip of a compulsion to follow her family, to repeat their tragedy, and this would be endangered by any rational attempt to evaluate the case for carrying out the burial. Ismene, on the other hand, senses only the urgency, not the repressed rationale, of her sister's appeal. Her lack of a pending marriage puts her in an emotionally quite different state. In fact, in her speech beginning at 49ff. she imagines successfully pleading (65-66) with the departed that a rational appreciation of their vulnerability would obtain forgiveness. Thus, although neither sister refers to the engagement, the theme of Antigone's aborted marriage is present from the beginning, below the surface to be sure, but helping to motivate, at least retrospectively, the bitterness in their exchange.

If we have supplied a partial explanation of the delayed overt emergence of the marriage theme, we can also see why it can safely surface when it does. For by this point in the play Antigone has done all she can to honour her brother, and her trial and sentence at Kreon's hands has already been accomplished. The pressure, as it were, is off, and she herself can reflect on the nuptial loss, in the *kommós* and elsewhere at the end, as we have seen. And when the chorus suggests that her downfall is in payment for her father's sin they hit a now-exposed nerve (853-

856) as she herself tells us - 'You have touched on my most painful thoughts' (857-858). It all breaks through for a painful moment, the horror of her parents' incest, the reproach against them all, including Polyneikes, for bringing her down to them ἀπαῖος ἄγαμος (859-868). She even closes this lament with the words 'you have killed me' (871).

That her resolve returns later, and she expresses fervent hope that she will be welcomed by them all in turn, as φίλη as ever (897-899), does not change the status of her sacrifice. After all, it was Antigone herself who compared her fate to that of Niobe in an earlier antistrophe (832-833), stressing that it was most like her own. Commentators point out that there are physical similarities between the rocky graves of these two Theban princesses, but perhaps an even deeper connexion is suggested by the fact that Niobe had once revelled in her marriage to a Theban king, only to have her children cruelly taken from her. If Antigone saw a vaguely similar disaster if she went ahead with her own marriage plans, we can only pity her all the more for electing, albeit unconsciously, to bring the Labdakid line to an end.

It is tempting to seek confirmation of these impressions of Antigone's inner struggle by (briefly) considering the familiar problem posed by lines 904-920, which are bracketed by Jebb as an early interpolation. This is because, although Aristotle took them straight (*Rhetoric* III. 16. 1417a28ff.), her explanation that she could not replace a dead brother since her parents are dead although suitable substitutes for a husband of children could be found, strikes us as forced, sophistical, certainly contrived. Are we really to accept this claim that she would have left anyone but a brother 'lie mouldering' in the grave (ἐπύμετο 906)? The parallel to be found in Herodotus (3.119) is supposed sufficient by some scholars, but Reinhardt, for one, who accepts the lines, finds it nevertheless necessary to ground the preference for a sibling on a *nomos* (cf. 914):

'If it were only psychological, only an individual case, it would have no place in a Sophoclean tragedy. The question of the *nomos* is important enough to be given a central position in this most emotional speech. Antigone's urge to explain her action can only be satisfied by referring the present example to the general rule. Admittedly, in establishing this *nomos* Sophocles follows a Herodotean anecdote. But even in its changed context in Sophocles, the 'calculation' is not as illogical as commentators have thought. For it is not this one particular action of Antigone, but the *nomos* of her action that is based on the fact that husband and child can be replaced, a brother not. The *nomos* remains, whether brother or sister are alive or dead. And if we disregard Goethe's psychological drama ... if we grant the validity of the human and general circumstances which make sense in the light of the *nomos*, then the 'calculation' yields to a proof which can hardly be disregarded any longer: just as Antigone follows divine law, and her own nature, so too she follows the *nomos* of love for her brother. For Sophocles the one embraces the other.'<sup>6</sup>

This valiant attempt to defend the speech by reference to a supposed general law of sibling-hood seems, for its part, every bit as 'calculated' as the original. Superficially convincing, it does not do justice to Antigone's underlying motivation. On the reading of her character defended above she is caught in the net of a family 'repetition compulsion', a scenario that must be played out for admittedly 'illogical' reasons. When she can recognize the enormity of her sacrifice, i.e. after she has been condemned, she comes up with an explanation that amounts to an elaborate rationalization of her choice. Note that this is not to be seen as a deliberate self-deception. She sincerely believes that some higher calling justifies her action. That is why she refers to a *nomos*, as Reinhardt sees. But there is no need to prohibit a psychological underpinning for the acceptance of a suspicious rationale so readily. Antigone has once again indicated the tempestuous state of her inner self by the need for a suitably high-flown defence. As the chorus almost wryly notes -

ἐτι τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνέμων αὐταὶ  
ψυχῆς ῥιπαὶ τήνδε γ' ἔχουσιν. (929-930)

6. Karl Reinhardt, *Sophocles*, tr. H. Harvey and D. Harvey, New York, Barnes & Noble, 1979, pp.83-84.

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KENNETH WELLESLEY (Edinburgh): *A privy council on the behaviour of freedmen* (*Tacitus*, A.13.26.2)  
LCM 8.9 (Nov. 1983), 136-139

'A corpse, for which I can provide only undertakers, not doctors'. Such was Justus Lipsius' description of a notorious passage in Tacitus, *Annals* 13.26.2, which in M (the recentiores have nothing much to our purpose) runs as follows:

.ille an auctor constitutionis fieret.  
ut inter paucos & sententiae adversos. quibusdam colitam  
libertatem inreuerentiam eo prorupisse frementibus. uine  
an aequo cum patronis iure agerent. sententiam  
eorum consultarent, ac uerberibus manus ultro inten-  
derent. impulere uel poenam suam dissuadentes

colitam M caolitam M<sup>2</sup> coalitam Ia  
libertatem M libertate Ia

Reasonable men might well feel that it is now too late to do anything. Before and since Lipsius, and especially in the flurry of Tacitean activity that distinguished nineteenth-century Germany (Gustav Freytag's *Die verlorene Handschrift* is very good reading), the most



varied kisses of life have been imprinted on the corpse, but without much prospect of resuscitation. Our two standard texts are melancholy. Fisher prudently but passively places obeli around the whole passage. Koestermann contents himself with a lacuna, a supplement and an obelus. *LCM* - in view of its Editor's policy and of my remarks in *JRS* 72(1982), 214, about shunting - is perfectly designed to accommodate a provisional cure which I describe as briefly as possible, with the benefit of the editions and of the discussions of Ruperti 1809, Anquetil 1817, Möbius 1821, Fröhlich 1827, Roth 1833, Doederlin 1834, Jacob 1838, R.Seyffert 1843, Bezzenberger 1844, Nipperdey 1847, Urlichs 1848, Heinisch 1850, Halm 1850, Linker 1853, Wurm 1854, Woelffel 1856, Sirker 1860, Vielhaber 1860, Ritter 1863, Madvig 1873, Maguire 1879, Schütz 1882, Draeger 1882, Constans 1899, Waltz 1905, Thomas 1919, Koch 1923 and Lynch 1945.

A demand is being voiced in the Senate that unsatisfactory freedmen should have their emancipation revoked. This has already been done by Claudius (Suetonius, *Claudius* 25.1), but seems still to have been a potentially dangerous step. The proposal is widely supported by the Fathers, but the consuls think it best to consult the emperor rather than put the matter to a vote in the house. They communicate to Nero the general feeling. A privy council (*pauci* of unspecified identity) is called, but it itself divided. The arguments of the hardliners are introduced by an ablative absolute (*quibusdam ... frementibus*), and those of the softliners, with a typical Tacitean variation (Sörbom 122-9, esp. 123), by a main clause at 27.1 *disserebatur contra ...*. A cautious policy is finally announced: 27.3 *scripsit Caesar senatui, priuatim expenderent causas libertorum ... in commune nihil derogarent*.

The seats of textual corruption are at least five. I deal with them roughly in order of importance.

1. Attempts to salvage *impulere* (principally by Möbius and Lynch) are a failure because a) an indicative is in itself grammatically unlikely, despite some queer practices in Tacitus, in a context which has just become indirect; b) the verb has no obvious construction in which one can believe; and c) nobody impelled anybody, and to what goal impulsion could have been directed is mysterious: it cannot easily be conjectured from the preceding or following words. Among the emendations proposed, *impune fere*, 'usually getting away with it' (Bezzenberger and Sirker) and *impune rei* (Urlichs and Ritter) are attractive, especially the latter owing to its point and its closeness to the corrupt *impulere*. Whether *uel* means 'or' or 'actually' is not clear, though it may be pointed out that *uel = etiam* (Gerber-Greef's rubric II, p.1745) is comparatively rare. I suspect that Tacitus is trying to frame an antithesis hingeing on *uel*: either the *patroni* know that no penalty will be awarded if the accused are taken to court or the *liberti* say 'We wouldn't advise your seeking redress because you won't get it'.

Read therefore (since various attempts to tamper with the *dissuadentes* of the MSS are totally unnecessary):

*impune rei uel poenam suam dissuadentes.*

2. It has been rightly observed by Draeger that *sententiam ... consultare* is not Latin, and a consultation of TLL and GG confirms this. Proposed remedies are:

- a) bracket *sententiam eorum* and make *uine an ...* the object of *consultarent*: painless but arbitrary, and the reason for the intrusion of a not very likely marginal gloss *sententiam eorum* imagined by proponents is unclear;
- b) change *sententiam* to *patientiam* (*insultarent*) (Anquetil, Draeger) or *clementiam* (*conculcarent*) (Ryckius, Sirker): an implausible and wilful substitution;
- c) change *eorum* to *praetorum* (Vielhaber) or *amicorum* (R.Seyffert), keeping *consultarent*: violent and still unlatin;
- d) for *eorum* read *coram* and for *sententiam* read *sed etiam* (*coram* Muretus, *sed etiam coram* Fröhlich, Linker, Wurm, Thomas): acceptable palaeographically and in sense. The word *coram*, especially if written with an open -a-, is virtually identical in appearance with *eorum*, and *sed etiam* with *sētētiam*. But *sed etiam consultarent* hardly looks like a reproach.

What verb, then, are we to employ with *sed etiam* so as to achieve a comfortable transition from the preceding *agerent* to the following *intenderent*? Not *consultarent*. Bezzenberger's and Sirker's *conculcarent*, though ingenious, is much too brutal: the likelihood of a claim that the freedmen trampled on their patrons (or even their patience or clemency) seems to me slight. There remains (and I can imagine no other alternative) *insultarent* (Ruperti, Anquetil, Draeger, Fröhlich, Linker), which is Tacitean and conceivably corruptible by scribal error (*isultarent* | *isultarent*), especially if the scribe had already read or understood *sententiam* and imagined (wrongly) that *sententiam consultare* was possible Latin.

3. Granted that Tacitus wrote *sed etiam*, then *non modo*, *non solum* or *non tantum* is wanted in the preceding clause (GG 963). The MSS have:

*uine an aequo cum ...*

Ω

*ui an aequo cum ...*

L24 B72 Y01

It is agreed by all scholars that *ut* is necessary to introduce the consecutive clause invited by *eo prorupisse*, and the reason for the loss is obvious (*ut* | *ui*). The favourite solution, *ut uine an aequo ... agerent ... consultarent*, creates an intolerably involved construction: a dependent question within a consecutive, with two imperfect subjunctives *agerent* and *consultarent* or whatever, one subordinate to the other; and an implausible situation, in which the *liberti* are alleged to ask their *patroni* whether they, the *liberti*, should proceed by violence or by equal legal process. This is not only tortured Latin (which, contrary to common belief, is not typical of Tacitus), but it lowers the tone of the complaint attributed to a party in the *consilium principis* to the level of the knock-about Roman stage: Libertus to patronus: 'Please give me some advice. Do you want me to knock you down? Or would you rather I took you to court, where we shall be on equal terms?'. The entire unsuitability of such a conception as this to the dignity of Tacitean history must be stressed, because this interpretation is well on the way to becoming standard, despite the misgivings from time to time expressed ('very corrupt',

- 138 'desperate attempts', 'it is not improbable that one or more sentences have been lost', Furneaux; 'Das Latein ist abscheulich ... eine zweifelsfreie Klärung der schwierigen Zusammenhänge ist noch nicht gelungen', Koestermann).

Of the many other suggested forms of emendation, there are two compatible with a succeeding *sed etiam* *ut n<on> iam aequo* Fröhlich, Linker  
*ut n<on modo> aequo* Wurm.

The virtues of both may be combined with advantage. A word conveying 'only' is required, and *iam* is appropriate and close to *an*. I propose

*ut n<on> iam aequo <tantum> cum ...*

Once *ut non* or *utn* had been misread as *uin* and interpreted as *uine*, the passage of *an* to *iam* was almost inevitable; and the necessary *tantum* may have been omitted by homoeoteleuton error or by intentional excision.

We have now arrived at the following possible text for the more difficult area of corruption:

... *ut non iam aequo tantum cum patronis iure agerent, sed etiam coram insultarent, ac uerberibus manus ultro intenderent, impune rei uel poenam suam dissuadentes.*

We have three subjunctives in parallel and a pair of balanced participles with some degree of variation. The progression of thought is clear. 1. Having acquired, legally or by use, equality before the law, the *liberti* now insult their late masters. 2. To insults are added injury or the threat of injury. 3. So sure are they of acquittal in any legal action that they ironically advise their *patroni* not to take proceedings. We seem here to have a reworking of the passage at

A.3.36.1 *exim promptum quod multorum intimis questibus tegebatur. incedebat enim deterrimo cuique licentia impune probra et inuidiam in bonos excitandi arrepta imagine Caesaris; libertique etiam ac serui, patrono uel domino cum uoces, cum manus intenderent, ultro (? i. ultro,) metuebantur*

where we find the same sequence: legal impunity - insults - threats of violence - helplessness of the *patroni*.

4. The preceding words *quibusdam ... frementibus* seem to be intact. But we are in trouble at the beginning of the passage which in M (as in Ib, the class of *recentiores* most likely to be independent) runs, without any hint of a lacuna (which suggests that the trouble antedates M's exemplar) as follows:

*ille an auctor constitutionis fieret.  
 ut inter paucos & sententiae aduersos.*

Something clearly is missing: a main verb to support the lengthy sentence. One expedient, adopted by Linker and Vielhaber, is to disregard the punctuation (which is never sacred and appears to be overdone here) and find the verb further back:

... *perscripsere tamen consensum senatus, ille an auctor ... fieret ...*

There are three objections to this. One is that the appeal to the emperor is thereby represented as the general wish of the Senate, rather than - as the preceding words imply - a device thought up by the consuls to avoid putting the question in the chamber. A second is that a lengthy and cumbersome sentence is rendered lengthier and more cumbersome. A third is that the repunctuation places the complaints of the *fremetes* in the Senate, and not where they properly belong on a considered view of chh.26 and 27, in the *consilium principis*.

It is more usual, and certainly more credible, to posit a lacuna. Among the supplements so far proposed are:

<i>fieret &lt;agitauit&gt;</i>	<i>inter</i>	Anquetil	(possible)
<i>fieret &lt;consuluit&gt;</i>	<i>inter</i>	Bezenberger	(wrong verb)
<i>fieret &lt;consultauit&gt;</i>	<i>paucos</i>	Schütz	(wrong construction)
<i>fieret &lt;utitur&gt;</i>	<i>paucis ... aduersis</i>	Woelffel	(violent)
<i>fieret &lt;interrogat&gt;</i>	<i>paucos</i>	Ritter	(violent)
<i>diuersos &lt;dubitauit&gt;</i>	<i>quibusdam</i>	Wurm	(possible).

Before we consider the contents of the lacuna, it is well to decide whether *ut* is to be regarded as a vestigial remnant of a now vanished verb ending in *-at* or *-uit* or whether it is to be retained as an accompaniment to *inter* ... ('as is to be expected among ...'). That the latter is the better course seems clear from the avoidance of the vowel change and by the presence of two parallels in Tacitus, Agr.11.1 *indigenae an aduecti, ut inter barbaros, parum compertum* and Ger.22.1 *crebrae, ut inter uinolentos, rixae*. The matter to be supplied must tell us that Nero was puzzled or ignorant, that he sought the advice of his privy council, and that it was difficult to secure a unanimous decision. We shall therefore play with words like *ambiguus*, *consultauit*, *consilium*, *uarie certatum* and so forth. Though the supplements so far proposed nearly all involve the absorption of *ut*, other possibilities remain, rather more explicit, and preserving *ut*.

But if *ut* is kept, the comment it introduces must have been evoked by some allusion to the difficulty of making a decision. These considerations render it probable that we are dealing with the loss not of one word, but of a whole line. Propriety urges one to provide a *saut du même au même*, perhaps

*ille an auctor constitutionis fieret  
 <utitur consilio amicorum, diu ambiguus>  
 ut inter paucos ...*

5. There remains one substantial difficulty. M's *et sententiae aduersos* naturally sounds like 'and opposed to the view'. But which view? That an imperial constitution was desirable? Or that freedmen should be taught a lesson? And is *sententiae* after all dative? It might perhaps be genitive. The ambiguity is intolerable. The emendation *ei* for *et* (Möbius and others) provides a clear dative, but little else. The impending debate demands that we understand the words to mean 'of differing views'. Lipsius read *paucos et sententiae diuersos* (i.e. the corruption of *-aedi-* to *-aead-*). With *diuersos* an ablative is also permissible, and the change posited (*-adi-* to *-aead-*) not much more difficult. The combination of *pauci* with another adjective is quite in Tacitus' manner: H.4.43.2 *pauci et ualidi*; A.1.68.3 *paucos et semermos*.

I conclude that on the available evidence we should read:

ille, an auctor constitutionis fieret, utitur consilio amicorum, diu ambiguus ut inter paucos et sententiae diuersos, quibusdam coalitam libertate inreuerentiam eo prorupisse frementibus, ut non iam aequo tantum cum patronis iure agerent, sed etiam coram insultarent ac uerbis manus ultor intenderent, impune rei uel poenam sibi dissuadentes.

and translate:

'As to whether he should frame an imperial decree, Nero took the advice of his privy council. He was long in doubt, the discussion being conducted among a few ministers of conflicting views. Some of them exclaimed that emancipation had meant that freed slaves had become insolent towards their former masters - so much so that they were no longer content to sue them on equal terms, but hurled personal abuse at them and went out of their way to offer physical violence, confident in the knowledge that they would be acquitted in defendants in court proceedings, or alternatively warning the unhappy men not to resort to legal sanctions at all.

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R.W.SHARPLES(University College, London): *Knowledge and courage in Thucydides and Plato.*

LCM 7.9(Nov.1983), 139-140

In Plato's *Laches* (194e) Nicias defines courage as knowledge of what is to be feared and what is to be dared, of what should inspire fear and what confidence (τὰ δεινὰ καὶ θαρραλέα). The definition is rejected on the grounds that this amounts to knowledge of future goods and future evils and that this is not different from knowledge of goods and evils in general (198d & ff.); it is a commonly-held and plausible view that this is not in fact so much a fatal objection to the suggested definition, though it is presented as such in the dialogue, as an argument for the unity of courage and the other virtues, for the unity of moral knowledge in general. Similar definitions to that by Nicias appear at Plato *Protagoras* 360d and *Republic* 4 430b.

A very similar description of courage appears in the Funeral Speech attributed to Pericles in Thucydides Book 2 (40.3). '... whereas to the others it is ignorance that brings boldness, and thought brings hesitation. But the people who would rightly be judged best in spirit are those who know most clearly what is terrible (δεινὰ) and what is pleasant (ἡδέα), and on account of this do not turn away from dangers'. The parallels have long been noticed (cf. e.g. Marchant's note ad loc.; E.C.Marchant, *Thucydides: Book II*, London, Macmillan, 1891, 176), though they have perhaps been remarked upon more by Thucydidean scholars than by Platonists. There are however some interesting implications of a comparison between the passages, and it is these that I wish to discuss.

Firstly, when Nicias first links courage with knowledge, he cites Socrates himself for the connexion between virtue and knowledge (*Laches* 194d). But the Thucydidean passage shows that such ideas were not the peculiar prerogative of Socrates alone. Perhaps we can at the least say that the Thucydidean passage suggests the existence of a milieu of discussion of which Socrates' ideas formed part, to which he contributed and on which he drew - whether or not we suppose that the formulation in the Funeral Speech owes more to Thucydides than to Pericles.

The existence of such a milieu of intellectual discussion is, after all, what we might naturally expect. When Barrett, commenting on Euripides *Hippolytus* 380-1 ('we know and understand what is good, but do not carry it out'), argues that Euripides is not concerned with polemic against Socrates (W.S.Barrett, *Euripides: Hippolytus*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1964, 229) he is right in so far as the assumption that someone who does not do what is right may well not know what is right is not the peculiar prerogative of Socrates; Socrates simply took it to extremes. But at the same time it is true that, just as Socrates is certainly for us the figure with whom such ideas are chiefly connected, so even at the time they may already have been particularly linked with him. In his eagerness to deny that Euripides is solely concerned with Socrates here, Barrett may underestimate the extent to which there may well be some connexion. So H.Lloyd-Jones at *JHS* 85(1965), 167, argues rightly that a connexion is ultimately unprovable. Barrett does indeed argue that Euripides' Phaedra is polemicizing 'not against the Socratic explaining away of moral weakness in terms of ignorance, but against the much simpler view that wrongdoing is ordinarily due to natural vice'. But, firstly, for Socrates at least 'natural vice' is ignorance; and, given the intellectualizing tendency in Greek ethical thinking (cf. E.R.Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley, UCalPress, 1951, 16f.) this may have been true for others too. And, secondly, Phaedra does in fact speak about knowledge and understanding, not about natural vice or its absence. Socrates' view has the effect of making the morally weak person indistinguishable from the really wicked one; and it is against such an identification that Phaedra is protesting.

Secondly, Pericles says that the best person is the one who has knowledge of fearful and pleasant things and on account of this (διὰ τούτων) doesn't shun danger. There is a temptation to read the last clause as replying to a concession; the truly courageous man is the one who has knowledge and even so does not shun danger, as opposed to the one who is bold because he is ignorant. However, this cannot be the sense of Thucydides' words. It is true that he has just mentioned the Spartans (by implication) as being bold through ignorance, so there may indeed be something of a paradox in the idea that knowledge too can cause men to face dangers; but it is

this, that knowledge causes men to face dangers, that must be the primary meaning of Thucydides' words, rather than that the Athenians are brave in spite of their knowledge.

There is a parallel difficulty in the *Laches*. After getting Laches to admit that courage, as a virtue, must be not just endurance but wise endurance, Socrates objects that people with knowledge - such as those who know how to dive into wells - are in fact less courageous than those who perform the actions while lacking the skill; and similarly, someone who holds out in battle knowing that reinforcements are on the way is less courageous than someone who holds out not knowing this (193a-d). Nevertheless, Socrates raises no objection when Nicias immediately afterwards interprets courage in terms of knowledge.

Commentators have generally agreed that the apparent inconsistency in fact points to a difference between technical skill or knowledge of facts (Laches) and moral knowledge, knowledge of values (Nicias); it is the latter, rather than the former, that is essential for - Socrates would say, that constitutes - courage. And the apparent paradox in the

ed in a similar way. For in the context of the Funeral Speech as a whole its point is surely, as Marchant's comments suggest, that the Athenians, unlike the Spartans, have knowledge of the good things of life as well as of the fearful, and that it is this that inspires their courage.

This is indeed on the face of it a rather different point from Plato's. Thucydides speaks of knowledge of the fearful and of the pleasant, whereas Plato only mentions knowledge of what is and is not fearful (and the latter is the formulation actually used in the *Protagoras* and the *Republic*). Plato's initial point is that the mistaken belief that what is in fact fearful is not so produces rashness, while the mistaken belief that what is not in fact fearful is fearful produces cowardice. Nicias is happy to accept the implication that courage, being based on knowledge, is not to be found in irrational animals; courage is to be distinguished from mere boldness (197a).

However, the explanation of what is and is not to be feared in terms of good and evil in general does relate knowledge about these things to knowledge of values in general. Plato might well not have agreed with Pericles' estimate of many of the ἡδέα which the latter thinks inspire the Athenians to bravery (cf. his comments at *Gorgias* 518e); but it is to a knowledge of values that both Plato and Thucydides' Pericles are appealing as the foundation of true courage, different though the values may be in each case.

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J.R.HAMILTON(Otago, New Zealand): *Thucydides* 6.49.4

LCM 8.9(Nov.1983), 140

ναῦσταθμον δὲ ἐπαναχωρήσαντας καὶ ἐφορμηθέντας Μέγαρα ἔφη χορῆναι  
ποιεῖσθαι, ἃ ἦν ἐρῆμα, ἀπέχοντα Συρακουσῶν οὔτε πλοῦν πολὺν οὔτε ὁδόν.

In his commentary on this passage, Sir Kenneth Dover rightly rejects the Mss. reading<sup>1</sup> ἐφορμηθέντας, which in this context must be a form of ἐφορμεῖν (not ἐφορμᾶν) and mean 'blockaded'. The simplest emendation, he suggests, is Schaefer's ἐφορμισθέντας 'coming to anchor'. He mentions Böhm's ἐφορμῆσιν τὰ as an alternative, but considers that 'the definite article with Μέγαρα in this context does not sound quite right; 75.1 is different, for there we have a succession of new proper names each with the article, giving the effect, "here, and there, and there".'

Schaefer's emendation, besides producing a sense that is weak and tautological, has the disadvantage that the aorist passive of ἐφορμίζειν is not found elsewhere in Greek prose<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, there are strong positive reasons for adopting Böhm's suggestion.

In the previous chapter Alcibiades has suggested that the Athenian commanders should first win over Messana because of its strategic position (ἐν πόρῳ γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ προσβολῇ εἶναι αὐτοὺς (sc. τοὺς Μεσσηνίους) τῆς Σικελίας, καὶ λιμένα καὶ ἐφορμῆσιν τῇ στρατιᾷ ἱκανωτάτην εἶσεσθαι), bring over the (other) towns, and then and only then (οὕτως ἤδη) attack Syracuse and Selinus. In Chapter 49 Lamachus challenges this strategy, advocating instead an immediate attack on Syracuse. The Syracusans, he suggests, will be taken unawares and in all probability many will be captured outside the city. If the victorious Athenians proceed to blockade the city, then and only then (οὕτως ἤδη) the remaining Sicilian cities will join them without waiting to see which side will win.

Thucydides underlines the challenge to Alcibiades' strategy both by the repetition of οὕτως ἤδη and by echoing λιμένα καὶ ἐφορμῆσιν. Megara is only a short distance from their real objective, Syracuse, by land or sea. Messana, so Lamachus implies, is far away.

Nor does the use of the direct article with Μέγαρα pose any difficulty. Commentators<sup>3</sup> refer to 6.97.5, φρούριον ... ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, and 7.25.4, αὐλάξαντες δ' αὐτοὺς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι εἴκοσι ναυσὶ πρὸς τοῖς Μεγάροις μίαν μὲν ναὺν λαμβάνουσιν αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσι, ... . In fact, if we look at the passages in which Thucydides mentions Megara in Greece we see that he uses the definite article with the noun 8 times and omits it in 10. He appears to have no fixed rules about the inclusion or omission of the articles with place-names; for example, at 1.105.6 he has ἐκ τῶν Μεγάρων, while at 6.4.1 & 2 ἐκ Μεγάρων contrasts with 2.94.3, ἐς τὰ Μέγαρα ... ἐπὶ τῆς Κορίνθου.

1. The reading of H is not legible, but was not ἐφορμηθέντας (Dover).

2. It is misleading to cite Xenophon, *HG* 1.4.8, Ἀλκιβιάδης πρὸς τὴν γῆν ὀρμισθεὶς, as an example, as Dover does. The simple verb is not the compound.

3. Classen-Steup, for example, who accept the emendation, as does the editor of the Budé edition. For a discussion of the passage see Rudolf Stark on pp.271-2 of the *Anhang* to the 1963 reprint of Classen-Steup.

Commentators tend to regard poem 6 as a frivolous example of a hackneyed genre: Ellis 20 deemed it interesting only for what he believed were its later echoes in Ovid, *Am.* 3.14.9-11, while M.G.Morgan, *CQ* ns27(1977), 338, thinks it 'hardly one of Catullus' more memorable poems'. Certainly the piece is playful in tone, and the motif of sympathetic outsider inquiring into circumstances of friend's love life turns up frequently elsewhere (e.g. *AP* 12.71 & 134 [Callimachus] and 135 [Asclepiades]; Catullus 55; Propertius 1.9; Horace, *Odes* 1.27 & 2.4; see A.L. Wheeler, *Catullus and the traditions of ancient poetry*, 1934 repr. 1964, 227). Yet neither its apparent levity nor the ubiquity of its controlling *topos* should militate against the possibility that poem 6 is actually an original and fundamentally serious poetic statement. My essay sets out to explore that possibility.

J.Evrard-Gillis' brief observation (*Latomus* 36[1977], 122) that the central theme of 6 is '*la parole opposée au silence*' affords a point of departure for literary analysis. The entire composition is in fact structured upon that radical antithesis of speech and silence. Its first sentence presents a hypothetical triad of speaker, subject matter and auditor:

*Flavi, delicias tuas Catullo,  
ni sint illepidas atque inelegantes,  
velles dicere nec tacere posses.*

The addressee Flavius (whose identity is otherwise unknown) may well be a generalized type of the lover, his name slyly alluding to the romantic golden locks of conventional literary heroes and heroines (cf. 64.63, Ariadne; 64.98, Theseus; 66.62, Berenice; 68.130, Protesilaus). As lover, he should wish, and indeed feel compelled, to speak of his girl friend and his experiences (*delicias* is surely deliberately ambiguous) to an interested third party, who is here characterized as 'Catullus' in his familiar *persona* of neoteric poet. For the ideal liaison, then, the confidant becomes as necessary as the beloved herself, a conclusion already foreshadowed by the neat syntactical progression of nouns in the opening line. In established ring-composition manner, that speaker/subject-matter/auditor triad will be reintroduced near the end of the poem, with the object of discourse now placed first for added emphasis:

*quare, quidquid habes boni malique,  
dic nobis.* 15-16

Note, however, that the idea of communication voluntarily made is then immediately transferred from speech to writing, and from the original speaker to the erstwhile passive listener Catullus, who will proceed to convert Flavius and his affair into the subject of embellished literary discourse:

*volo te ac tuos amores  
ad caelum lepido vocare versu.* 16-17

Those real-life experiences, first shared orally with the poet and then transmitted by him to his readers, emerge at two removes as the heightened material of art.

Between these fixed points of yet unrealized communication - one instance contrary-to-fact, one proposed - the text is pervaded by the unnatural silence of the lover, who remains obstinately mum in defiance of erotic convention, the demands of art, and his own instincts. As a substitute for his voice, however, we hear the actual clamour of a host of ostensibly mute objects telling his tale for him. Through the useful forensic trope of 'wordless testimony', in which the orator becomes the mouthpiece of those who cannot or will not utter their sentiments aloud (cf. Cicero, *Cat.* 1.20-21 and *Div. Caec.* 21), Flavius' redolent bedroom and his much-abused bed are allowed to bear witness to their occupant's nocturnal activities. Even the debilitated state of his own body informs against him - or, rather, he informs against himself through it. As Kroll, *ad loc.*, perceived, *pandas* (13) makes the lover himself 'display', and so 'publish', the physical traces of his own dissipation. By allowing the attentive Catullus to observe his general lassitude, not to mention the mess in his bedroom, Flavius betrays his involvement with a *scortum febriculosum* (4-5) even as he attempts to conceal the fact. He is like Roland Barthes' cautious amorist who dons sunglasses to hide eyes swollen from weeping, all the while hoping his beloved will infer that something is wrong from those unaccustomed dark glasses. For the Barthesian lover, passion must be declared, yet the spoken word is essentially a means of concealment: 'The task of the verbal signs will be to silence, to mask, to deceive: I shall never account, verbally, for the excesses of my sentiment ... with my language I can do everything: even and especially say nothing' (*Fragments d'un discours amoureux*, tr. as *A Lover's Discourse* by R.Howard, 1978, 43-44; Barthes' italics). His self-revelation, and Flavius' as well, is achieved by withholding direct speech and turning signification over to inanimate objects (sunglasses, beds) and the voiceless but eloquent body. Only thus can the message of passion be truthfully conveyed without compromising the dignity of the one who feels passion.

Yet poem 6 takes erotic semiotics one step further than Barthes by allowing art, recognized since Plato's time as the ultimate medium of falsification, to serve a redemptive purpose. Flavius is right to be ashamed of *deliciae* that are *illepidae atque inelegantes* (1-2), for he is violating the canonical precepts of neoteric decorum. His girl is no *puella docta* (on the implications of *scortum febriculosum* see Morgan 339), and his sexual transactions with her have been stupidly excessive:

*non tam latera ecfutata pandas,  
ni tu quid facias ineptiarum.* 13-14

As a spokesman for that aesthetic canon, however, Catullus assures his friend that such shortcomings can be transformed through poetry. He will glorify Flavius and his lady love (for the meaning of *ad caelum vocare* [17] see Kroll *ad loc.*) by fashioning verse that will endow them with its own proper *lepor*.

All well and good, but what verse does Catullus really have in mind? Why, the very lines that his addressee and we have just finished reading - lines that have already transmogrified the

sordid details of the liaison into the stuff of polished wit. The conclusion of the poem is self-referential, *lepido ... versu* (17) pointing back to the sophisticated craftsmanship of lines 6-11: one long inverted periodic sentence laying out the evidence for its subject's doings with an arch reference (*tacitum ... clamat*) to Ciceronian forensic techniques; scrupulously deploying its exact descriptive details; whimsically incorporating Hellenistic literary tradition into its personification of the bedroom and its contents; and finally building, through subtle rhythmic and alliterative modulations, to the sparkling metrical and onomatopoeic crescendo of *argutatio inambulatioque* (11: on the calculated poetic effects of this passage see S.V.Tracy, *CP* 64[1969], 234-235, and Morgan 340-341). Then a swift change of tactics: one brusque obscenity, *ecfutata* (13), to haul us back down to the level of ordinary vernacular discourse and so clinch the argument. The resources of poetic language have been bent to the challenging task of investing a description of crass self-indulgence with urbane charm and turning its central figure into the protagonist of a bright comedy of manners. Poem 6 is therefore an *ad hoc* demonstration of how art can enhance even the rawest subject matter - and an implicit defence of poetic untruth.

To some, this reading may seem to lay too much of a burden of meaning on what is but a slight occasional poem. Yet scholars hesitant to accept my thesis should recollect Catullus' way of talking about poetry elsewhere in the polymetric collection. Forthright though he may be in expressing his dislike of specific rival authors, he often enunciates the principles of his personal artistic creed with a certain amount of diffidence, or under pretence of talking about something else entirely. Each of the texts now recognized as being wholly or partly a subtle literary manifesto - 1, 14, 16 (granted the interpretative difficulties that have sparked controversy about whether the piece is in fact programmatic; for opposing views see V.Buchheit, *Hermes* 104[1976], 331-347, and T.P.Wiseman, *LCM* 1.2[Feb.1976], 14-17), 35, 36, 44 and 50 - masquerades as another kind of poem: a dedicatory epistle; a thank-you note for a Saturnalia gift; an invective against two detractors; an invitation to visit Verona; a battle of wits with Lesbia; a rueful complaint of a cold; and, perhaps the most surprising, a tongue-in-cheek declaration of homosexual love. This practice of disguising aesthetic pronouncements is, I believe, linked to the literary convention of presenting artistic effort in the 'minor' genres as a mere game, a *ludus* (on the *ludus poeticus* see H.Wagenvoort, *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion*, 1956, 30-42). If one's art is to be deliberately and ironically trivialized, statements about that art should affect a surface ephemerality so as to trick the reader into recognizing them initially as the most banal of *nugae*. In manifestos such as these, Catullus confronts us with a 'poetics of indirection' that, again like Barthes' disingenuous lover, reveals its passionate concerns only to the perceptive. Poem 6 is another example of such indirection. Nothing could be more trivial than its seeming subject matter, a young man's passing infatuation for a low-class prostitute. Only through discreet hints - the reiterated motif of breaking silence, the pointed contrast of *deliciae illepidae* (2) and *versus lepidus* (17) - is its nugatory posture exposed as a clever falsehood. Art, in poem 6, dissembles about many things; not least, about itself.

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G.A.H.CHAPMAN(Natal): *A note on Sallust*, *Bellum Catilinae* 3.1

*LCM* 8.9(Nov.1983), 142

*sed in magna copia rerum aliud alii natura iter ostendit. pulchrum est bene facere rei publicae, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est: vel pace vel bello clarum fieri licet. et qui fecere et qui facta aliorum scripsere, multi laudantur.*

P.McGushin, in his Leiden commentary, 1977, comments on *bene facere ... bene dicere*: 'the meaning of the sentence is clear: "to serve once's country is glorious, but even to praise it is not unacceptable". Others, he says, have wrongly assumed that the meaning is unclear, and he dismisses the view of Leeman (*Mnemosyne* 7[1954], that *rei publicae* is to be understood after *dicere*, 'to speak well to the advantage of the state', referring to oratory and the forum; finally he wonders whether a desire for word-play has led Sallust to write nonsense, and concludes 'This indeed seems to be the case. Such a contention may be argued in one of two ways. Either (i), since it is not the function of a historian *bene dicere de re publica* or anything of the kind, but, as is so often emphasised by the historians themselves and by others (e.g. Cicero) *verum dicere*, without fear or favour, S. has got himself into a great muddle of thought. Or (ii), since without necessarily deserting the truth, a historian may choose *celebrare res nobiles, bene gestas* etc. (cf. esp. Livy), S., carried away by the desire to play with words, has carelessly singled out one aspect of historical writing as if this were history all in all.'.

If, as McGushin seems to admit, Sallust has written nonsense, and may have got himself into a great muddle of thought, it is hardly surprising that some scholars have found the passage unclear (though not Seager, apparently, who comments favourably on McGushin's treatment of it, *JRS* 68[1978], 228). The answer, I think, lies between McGushin and Leeman: there surely is a play on words between *bene facere* and *bene dicere*, but the appropriate meaning for the latter is not 'praise' nor 'speak well' but 'write for the advantage (of the state)'; Sallust's modest suggestion is that words as well as deeds can benefit the state and win praise from it. Rolfe, in the Loeb of 1921, translated correctly, I think: 'It is glorious to serve one's country by deeds; even to serve her by words is not a thing to be despised ...'. It is entirely in character for Sallust to use *dicere* in a poetic sense (= *scribere*), an equation which McGushin might be implying, but ... needed comment and comparison with its subsequent use (Sallust, *BJ* 95.2; Livy 7.29.1; Velleius 2.18.1; Tacitus, *H.* 1.1, and, not least, *A.* 1.1 *temporibus Augusti dicendis non defuere decora ingenta*).

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JAMES DIGGLE (Queens' College, Cambridge): *A new verse of Timon of Phlius?* LCM 8.9 (Nov. 1983), 143 143

*Supplementum Hellenisticum* (edd. Lloyd-Jones and Parsons), no. 844 (Timo Phliasius):

ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ταῦτα νῦν κέκριται.

The verse is quoted by Sextus Empiricus, *adu.math.* 11.140, II p.405 Mutschmann:

μόνος οὖν ἔσται φυγεῖν ταύτην, εἰ ὑποδείξαμεν τῷ παραττομένῳ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κακοῦ  
φυγὴν ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δόξαν ὅτι οὔτε ἀγαθὸν τι φύσει ἔστι οὔτε κακόν, ἄλλὰ  
πρὸς ἀνθρώπων κτλ.

One thinks of Theognis 136 εἴτ' ἀγαθὸν γίνεται εἴτε κακόν and Mimnermus fr. 2.4-5 West πρὸς  
θεῶν εἰδοτες οὔτε κακόν | οὔτ' ἀγαθόν, and wonders whether Sextus' prose does not conceal a second  
pentameter: οὔτ' ἀγαθὸν τι φύσει γίγνεται (ἔστι Sextus) οὔτε κακόν.

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L.A. HOLFORD-STREVEN (Oxford): 1. *Two notes on minor Greek poets*

LCM 8.9 (Nov. 1983), 143-144

2. *Five notes on Aulus Gellius*

1.a. Timon of Phleious, *Suppl. Hell.* Lloyd-Jones & Parsons 828 ap. Gellius NA 3.17.6

καὶ σύ, Πλάτων· καὶ γὰρ σε μαθητείας πόθος ἔσχεν,  
πολλῶν δ' ἄργυρίων ὀλίγην ἡλλάξας βίβλον,  
ἐνθεν ἀπαρχόμενος τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐδιδάχθης.

καὶ σύ, Πλάτων

In καὶ σύ, Πλάτων we have a Greek example of the review-formula found in Cicero, *poet.* fr. 2  
Morel *tu quoque qui solus lento sermone, Terenti ...*  
and in Caesar's far finer *contrafactum* (fr. 2 Morel), not to mention Ausonius, *epist.* 22.58-60; cf.  
Ed. Fraenkel, *KL. Beitr.* ii. 207.

b. P. Bon. 4. iii<sup>r</sup> 7-8 = vv. 103-4

αἱ δὲ βίον ε[οφί]ησιν ἐκόσμεον· ἡ γὰρ ἀουδά[ε]  
θεσπεσίας [... ] τεύσαν ἐν Ἀπόλλωνος [

104 [ἔρ] Thierfelder, Weys [ἄλ] Vogliano

For αἱ ... ἐκόσμεον Lloyd-Jones and Parsons (*Kyklos*, Festschrift Keydell, 95) adduce Vergil,  
*Aen.* 6.663 *inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artis;*  
what follows seems related to the preceding verse in Vergil

*quique pii uates et Phoebæ digna locuti.*

In 104 perhaps we should consider [ἄ] τεύσαν (cf. Empedocles DK 31 B 3.2

ἐκ δ' ὀρίων στοιμάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγὴν);

the image, if we accept ἄλ, would be of irrigation.

2.a. C. Julius Caesar, *de analogia* fr. 2 Funaioli ap. Gellius NA 1.10.4

*tamquam scopulum sic fugias inauditum atque insolens uerbum*

In Gellius this sentence is quoted as a warning against excessive archaism (cf. 11.7) that  
does not adorn the style but obscures the meaning; in Caesar, however, it was a warning rather  
against uncouth neologism and analogical formations with no support from usage (cf. Varro *LL.* 9.  
35). Funaioli's note implies the correct interpretation, but literary historians often make Cae-  
sar attack Gellius' (or Favorinus') target as if it were his own. From Caesar's point of view  
Gellius would be just as insupportable as those he assails.

b. Claudius Quadrigarius, fr. 57 Peter ap. Gellius NA 2.2.13, the famous incident of 213 B.C.  
in which Fabius Cunctator is made to dismount by his son the consul.

From Livy 24.44.9 we know that the elder Fabius was a *legatus*; on the model of this story,  
it has been suggested (E. T. Salmon, *Samnium and the Samnites*, Cambridge U.P. 1967, 274) was in-  
vented Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus' legateship to his son Gurgus in 292 B.C.. But Quadrigarius  
makes him proconsul, in the year after he had been a consul; I should be glad if the specialists  
in Republican historiography would consider whether that was a simple anachronism on his part or  
reflects a version of history devised for the defence of Cn. Mallius Maximus at his trial after  
the disaster of Arausio, at which he, as consul, had begged in vain for the cooperation of the  
proconsul Q. Servilius Caepio, who like the Cunctator had been consul the year before.

c. P. Scipio Africanus minor, fr. 20 Malcovati<sup>3</sup> ap. Gellius, NA 2.20.6

*ubi agros optime cultos atque uillas excolitissimas uidisset, in his regionibus  
excelsissimo loco grumam statuere aiebat; inde corrigere uiam, aliis per uineas  
medias, aliis per roborarium atque piscinam, aliis per uillam.*

Rolfe, like everybody else, translates: 'When he had seen the highly-cultivated fields and  
well-kept farmhouses, he ordered them to set up a measuring-rod ...'. But in the Latin of the

second century B.C. *ubi uidisset* cannot mean either *ubi uidit/cum uidisset* of a single occasion or *ubi uiderat* frequentative (at Plautus, *Bacch.* 431 *ubi reuenisses domum* is ideal second person); and *aiebat* cannot mean *iubebat* at any time. We have here an indirect statement with the subject (presumably *eum* rather than *se*, the action being distinctly undesirable) to be understood (Leumann-Hofmann-Szantyr ii.362 §198a): 'he said that wherever [rather than 'whenever'] he saw (*ubi uidisset* being *oratio obliqua* for *ubi uidit*) the best-farmed fields and the best-kept farmhouses, he ordered ...'. *corrigeret* implies straightening an existing road, Madvig's *derigere* building a new one, which *a priori* seems more probable.

- d. Varro, *LL* 8, fr.12 Funaioli ap. Gellius, *NA* 2.25.9  
*Sisenna unus 'adsentio' in senatu dicebat et eum postea multi secuti, neque tamen uincere consuetudinem potuerunt.*

Beginning with Quintilian 1.6.3, scholars have missed the point of *in senatu*. There is nothing wrong with *adsentio* active as such, although Cicero, Livy and Seneca do not favour it; in the perfect *adsensi* is the normal form (for grammatical doctrine on *adsentio* see Quintilian 9.3.7, Gellius 15.9.4 & 18.12.10; Caper at *GLK* 7.107.9 even prescribes it), but Sisenna, *quasi emendator sermonis usitati cum esse uellet* (Cicero, *Brutus* 259), varied the standard formula *adsentior (illi)* for supporting a previous speaker (Cicero, *Att.* 7.3.5 & 7.7, *Phil.* 7.27; Claudius Caesar, *FIRA*<sup>2</sup> i.287 col.iii, line 22).

- e. Gellius, *NA* 2.27.3 *siquidem laetitia dicitur exultatio quaedam animi gaudio effluentior euentu rerum expetitarum.*

Again, Rolfe represents the *communis opinio*: 'For rejoicing is a certain exultation of spirit, delighting in the realization of something greatly desired'. But reference to Cicero, *Tusc.* 4.13, would show that *laetitia* and *gaudium* stand respectively for ἡδονή and χαρά in the Stoic doctrine of ἡδονή and εὐδαιμονία: *nam cum ratione animus mouetur placide atque constanter (constantiae is Cicero's name for the εὐδαιμονία), tum illud gaudium dicitur; cum autem inaniter et effuse animus exsultat, tum illa laetitia nimia uel gestiens dici potest, quam ita definiunt, sine ratione animi elationem.* Cf. Diogenes Laertius 7.114 ἡδονή δέ ἐστὶν ἀλογος ἐπαρσις ἐπ' αἰρετῶ δοκ-οῦντι ὑποχεῖν. *gaudio* must therefore be ablative of comparison and *effluentior* a true comparative: 'for delight is defined as a kind of exaltation of the spirit, more fervent than joy, at the occurrence of things sought after'; in Greek perhaps εἶγε ἡδονή λέγεται ἐπαρσις τις ψυχῆς χαρὸς ἀσφοδρότερα ἐπ' αἰρετοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν.

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RORY B. EGAN (Manitoba): *Apollo and the vultures* (Aeschylus, *Ag.* 55)

*LCM* 8.9 (Nov. 1983), 144

R.H. Allison recently (*LCM* 8.5 [May 1983], 79) addressed the old question of why, at *Ag.* 55 Apollo should be included, with Pan and Zeus, as one of those who might avenge the vultures for the loss of their nestlings. Zeus and Pan can be explained, but the question of why Apollo should be mentioned as never been 'answered with such plausibility'. Allison thus seems to reject, albeit tacitly, K. Clinton's suggestion (*AJP* 94 [1973], 282-288) that it was the topography of the Athenian acropolis with its cult sites of Apollo, Pan and Zeus that made the reference relevant to an audience which was seated in the vicinity. I would myself recognize merit in Clinton's argument as well as in Allison's suggestion that associative word-play has something to do with Aeschylus' introduction of Apollo, but I would also note the possibility that Apollo's connexions with vultures were more than textual or topographical.

Being a divinity associated with plague (both as bringer and averter thereof) Apollo could be expected to have affinities with carrion birds. As it happens we do have one testimony to a cultic connexion of Apollo with vultures. The mythographer Konon (*Diegeseis* 35 = *FGrH* 26 F 1) relates an aetiological story for the foundation of the cult of Apollo Gypaieus - Apollo of the Vultures or Vulturine Apollo - at *Ephesos*. This at least shows that some of the Ionian Greeks did associate the vulture with Apollo, and it suggests that their Athenian congeners might not have sensed the same anomaly or enigma in *Ag.* 55 that modern commentators have.

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The Editor, being himself unable himself to write a note to fill this space, and having nothing suitable available, uses it to print some further corrigenda to C.J. Rowe's article on the style of the Aristotelian ethical treatises, which he does with apologies to author and readers.

*LCM* 8.3 (Mar. 1983), p. 37 2nd line of text, the list should be ... γε, δὴ not γε, δέ ...

n. 48 should be completed 'But see below, *LCM* 8.5 (May 1983), 73.'

p. 39 end of penultimate paragraph, read 'δέ/ού + δέ', inserting /.

n. 61 should be completed '(for which see *LCM* 8.5 [May 1983], 73)'.

8.4 (Apr. 1983),

8.5 (May 1983), TABLE VI, line 11, 'B, εἴπερ A', the figures should be '2 3 1' not '2 2 1'.